The above text reads:
Von hier - dem Altoaer Bahnhof- wurden
am Freitag, den 28. Oktober 1938 mehr als
achthundert polnische Juden aus Hamburg -
Männer, Frauen und Kinder - durch die
Gestapo an die polnische Grenze abgeschoben.
Sie wurden am selben Tage, frühmorgens
verhaftet und in Sammellager gebracht.
Von dort transportierte man sie mit
Lastwagen zum Bahnhof Altona.
Mit einem Sonderzug mußten sie Hamburg
noch am selben Abend verlassen.
Viele von Ihnen sind später umgekommen.
Bezirksversammlung Altona 1987
The Poland Operation of the 27th/28th October 1938.
"My Dears!
Cilli will have already informed you of my fate. On Thursday the 27th October (1938)
at 9 p.m. two criminal-police officers called and demanded my passport and inserted
a deportation document, which I had to sign, and ordered me to accompany them.
Cilli and Bernd were already in bed. I had just finished work and was eating my meal
but had to immediately get dressed and accompany them. I could hardly speak for
fright. I will never forget this moment in my entire life. I was immediately imprison as if
I were a criminal. That was a terrible night for me. At 4 a.m. on Friday we were taken
to the central railway station under close guard by police and SS. We each received
a loaf of bread and margerine, and were loaded into railway carriages. What a scene
of cruelty. Weeping women and children, heart-rending scenes. We were then
transported, under close police guard, to the border. Arriving at the border at 5 p.m.
on Saturday we were herded over the border. Here a new scene of cruelty presented
itself. 8,000 individuals were stranded, three days long, on the station platform and
concourse. Unconscious women and children, hysteria, mortalities, yellow, waxen
faces. The living dead. I was one of the unconscious. There was nothing but dry
prison bread without anything to drink. No sleep, two nights on the platform and one
in the concourse where I collapsed. There was no more room to stand. A foul air.
Women and children half dead. Finally, on the fourth day, help came. Doctors and
nurses with medicine and bread and butter from the Jewish committee in Warsaw.
We were then taken to barracks (military stalls), strewn with straw upon which we
could lie. At last a warm gulp of tea, what joy. In despair, old Fränkel … committed
suicide on the rails, and four other deaths. Finally, after eight days, Red Cross
goulash urns arrived (hot food). I am glad, and thank God, that Cilli and the dear
children are not here, which is the case with other towns, because one needs nerves
of steel to undergo this strain.
This man, whom the police surprised in his flat late in the evening, had
personally given no cause for arrest: Otto Buchholz was one of around 17,000
Polish Jews who were, on the 27th and 28th October 1938, taken into remand
pending deportation, literally to be handed over to Poland, whose citizens they still
were but to whom they held no allegiance and which attempted to permanently
exclude them. Germany had repeatedly deported Polish Jews over the previous
two decades and Poland had frequently refused to receive them, although these
were individual cases (altogether thousands). Both countries sought to rid
themselves of an entire section of the population, i.e. Polish Jews.
The Period between the 17th Century and the end of the First World
War.
Jews from eastern Europe had migrated to Germany as early as the 17th century, but
it was the 1881 pogroms in Russia that provoked a mass exodus whose principal
goal was, however, the USA. Germany was mainly a transit country for these
migrants but a small number, both from Russia and from Austro-Hungary, remained.
In 1910 there were around 70,000. Whereas, up until this time, Germany had used
administrative measures, generally residence restrictions and numerous
deportations, during the First World War it recruited labour from Poland, including
Jews, or brought them as forced labour. In this way a further 30,000 Jews arrived in
Germany. However, in 1918, a special ban on entry to east European Jewish workers
was imposed on the grounds of preventing the import of typhus fever. That only Jews
from the infected areas were excluded entry did not even confirm the current stage of medical
research.
Following the Russian Revolution a total ban was imposed on entry from eastern
Europe. Entry was only possible on the basis of a special, restricted visa issued after
examination of the grounds for entry. Nevertheless, thousands of Jews entered
Germany, especially in 1919 and 1920, often without the requisit documents, fleeing
pogroms in the newly established republics of Poland and the Ukrain. Provided they
did not do anything illegal and that Jewish organisations financed their
accommodation, Germany initially tolerated these refugees out of consideration for
the threatening situation in their native countries. However, a minor criminal offence,
lack of accommodation or work were frequently sufficient grounds for deportation.
From 1923 onward no foreigner, who had emigrated prior to 1914, was to be
deported from Prussia, and also, as a rule, no foreigner who had been continuously
resident in Germany for four years and whose financial situation was secure. Having
survived these first four years and not having violated police regulations of entry or
registration east European Jews could legally expect a relatively secure existence in
Germany.
From Poland, on the contrary, they received no such security. Following the fall of the
Habsburg and Russian Empires the native country of the majority of east European
Jews came within the new Republic of Poland (in 1925, 50,993 of the 107,747
foreign Jews in Germany were Polish citizens). However, in numerous cases the
Polish authorities did not recognize their right of domicile. Poland refused them a
passport or blackmailed them: in return for citizenship they were to buy Polish
government bonds or join the armed forces. But, not possessing a valid passport
was a crimal offence in Germany. The Polish consulate frequently used the
application for citizenship as the opportunity to deprive citizenship. On the other
hand, Poland was prepared to represent the interests of Polish Jews as a counter
argument in the German-Polish conflict in which Germany made accusations against
Poland's treatment of its German minority. Or, and this was especially true in cases
of deportation, Jews were allowed to remain in Germany because their return to
Poland was not permitted. When, in October 1923, Bavaria imposed deportation
orders on a large group of east European Jews, Poland reacted, with retorsion, by
deporting German citizens resident in Poland. Such an action was customary, and
permissible under international law.
The Period between the end of the First World War and the coming to power of
the Nazis in 1933.
Following the First World War, re-established Poland was committed under the treaty
for the protection of minorities of the Paris Peace Conference to afford its national
minorities equal civil rights and moreover to permit them to establish schools and
religious, social and welfare institutions. The Jews, who in 1931 with 3.1 million
constituted 9.8% of the population, were socially and economically discriminated
against, i.e. almost entirely excluded from the civil service, and from 1937 onward
also excluded from various professional associations and trade organisations.
Although there was no statutory restricted entry at the universities there was a de
facto restriction and Jewish students had to sit on separate benches. In the allocation
of state commissions Jewish businessmen were rejected in favour of Christian Poles,
Sunday observance disadvantaged them as this meant that businesses were closed
two days a week (Sabbath being Saturday) and mixed businesses no longer had any
reason to employ Jews. Boycotts and the establishment of co-operatives aimed at
eradicating Jewish middlemen and establishing a Polish middle-class. Both official
policy and the attitude of the majority of Polish society was anti-Semitic.
From 1936 onward, the Polish government pursued a policy of mass Jewish
emigration which was supported by the majority of the Polish population. The Polish
government both supported the Zionist endeavour in Palestine and sought a League
of Nations mandate for the establishment of colonies - and in 1937 suggested
Madagascar as a goal for Jewish colonisation. However, at the same time Poland
allowed its Jewish minority freedom of cultural and political development. "Between
the world wars Polish Jews experienced both: suffering, that was partly due to anti-
Semitism, and success, that was facilitated by the freedom, plurality and tolerance in
Poland."
The early years of Nazi rule.
In the census of the 16th June 1933, carried out four months after the Nazis came to
power, there were still 98,747 foreign Jews in Germany, 56,480 (57.2%) of whom
were Polish Jews. However, already by this time, thousands of east European Jews
had returned to eastern and south-eastern Europe.
The immigration laws determined how these east European Jews were treated by the
state. These laws were generally tightened and amended with special regulations in
regard to east European Jews. A regulation affecting foreign employees enacted
immediately before the Nazi seizure of power required employers to have an
employment licence and the employee a work permit which were only valid for the
respective job. Foreigners who had been resident in Germany for a period of ten
years could obtain an exemption certificate valid nation-wide. As early as 1934 the
president of the Reich Department of Employment and National Insurance ordered
that foreign Jews should no longer be issued with such exemption certificates.
Traders required an authorisation permit or traders licence. Whereas, for native
Germans, these were valid nation-wide, for foreigners they were restricted to the
issuing district. And when, under Nazi law, there were insufficient grounds to
prove "trader unreliability" for a foreigner or "non-Aryan" a court could assume
unreliability, in regard to east European Jews, and reverse the burden of proof
so that they had to prove their reliability. Already by 1933 there were examples of
foreign Jews being denied permission to trade at trade fairs and markets. Their
livelihood was thereby withdrawn making them dependent on social welfare. And
foreigners permanently claiming social welfare could be asked to leave Germany and
then deported when they did not freely leave.
As early as 1933 east European Jews, who had up until this time possessed a
permanent residence permit, were summoned by the police to receive new permits
which restricted their further residence to a period of three to six months. Over the
following years various German states enacted regulations generally refusing
residence permits to immigrant Jews.
The deportation laws were tightened so that from 1934 onward foreigners were
deported from Germany and not merely from one of the German states. Additionally,
the grounds for exemption were reduced. And so in Prussia the police regulation,
stipulating that foreigners who had been resident in Germany for 10 years were
secure from deportation, was rescinded. Jews were regularly deported and minor
fines were sufficient grounds. Some of these deportations bore a campaign like
character. On the other hand occasionally the execution of the deportation order was
implemented with leniency.
It is conceivable that enforcement reflected, and therefore varied with, the state of
foreign relations. These Jews, as foreigners, were on the one hand subject to wide
restrictions but on the other hand afforded significant security. Foreign legations
repeatedly lodged complaints in support of their citizens as did Poland in March 1933
on the occasion of excesses against Polish Jews and in 1935 with a view to a more
moderate administration by the police responsible for immigrants. And although Nazi
policy was the same for both foreign and German Jews for years consideration of
foreign relations played a significant and moderating role. Foreigners were excluded from
the 1st April 1933 boycott of Jewish businesses, were not included in the "expiation
payment" ("Sühneleistung") for the 9th/10th November 1938 pogrom and were
excluded from the compulsory closure of retail shops on the 31st December 1938. It
was not until 1942/43 that the anti-Semitic legislation was fully extended to
include foreigners. Stateless persons were worse off than foreigners. All the
regulations that applied to foreigners applied to stateless persons but they did not
benefit from the principle of reciprocity, i.e. Germany granted foreigners every right
that German citizens enjoyed in their countries, for instance in regard to national
insurance or school fees. Essentially, stateless Jews had no country to represent their interests.
Stateless Jews like German Jews were subjected to the Nazi anti-Semitic
legislation.
One of the first anti-Semitic laws the Nazis passed, in July 1933, was that enabling
the revocation of all naturalizations that were effected during the Weimar Republic.
The regulation explicitly targeted east European Jews. Those affected were
individuals who had been resident in Germany for decades as they alone were
eligible for naturalization. As they were in general unable to re-acquire their prior
citizenship they were made stateless. They were unable to return to their native
countries and their chance of emigration was greatly reduced most countries only
permitting entry to foreigners whom they could, when necessary, deport back to their
native countries. Consequently, by means of these measures, the Nazis themselves
prevented the possibility of emigration to this group which had been their
policy even prior to their seizure of power.
The year 1938.
The Polish law of 31st March 1938 "concerning the withdrawal of Polish citizenship"
presented Germany with the prospect of having to accommodate an additional and
larger group of stateless Jews. Following this law a Polish citizen living abroad, who
had done something detrimental to Poland or who had lost connection to
Poland during uninterrupted residence of five or more years abroad or who,
at the request of Poland, had not returned to Poland within the statutory period,
had his citizenship revoked. The expatriation ruling that was issued by the
minister of the interior on instruction from the foreign minister required no justification
and could be enforced immediately.
This law, which was passed through both houses of parliament, the Seym and Senat,
within a period of a few days, was triggered by the German annexation ("Anschluss")
of Austria. Poland feared that its around 20,000 Jewish citizens resident in Greater
Germany would return en mass to Poland in order to escape German persecution.
The deputy foreign minister Szembek confided this to the French ambassador at a
later date. This was made plain at the time in the report to parliament. Prime minister
Slawoj-Skadkowski instructed that only 500 Jews be allowed entry prior to the
enactment of the law. At a meeting of various institutions at Gestapo headquarters on
the 21st April 1938 the problem posed to Germany was established: Once Polish
Jews resident in Germany became stateless it would be most difficult to compel them
to emigrate as no country would be willing to accept them, especially when Poland
itself denied them entry. However, immediately forcing them back to Poland would
provoke retorsion with the deportation of Germans living in Poland. There was no
other choice but to approach the Polish government for the assurance that it would
admit expatriated Polish Jews when Germany so requested. On the 24th May 1938
the German ambassador von Moltke visited the Polish deputy foreign minister but
despite all his reassurances the latter was not prepared to make such a formal
commitment. The official diplomatic note followed a month later. At the same time
von Moltke learnt, from a confidential source, that Poland had ordered Polish Jews
resident in Germany to present their passports with the intention of not returning
them.
In May 1938 the German ministry of the interior had given instructions not to renew
the residence permits of Polish Jews. In August 1938 the minister of the interior
imposed a new regulation for the immigration police. This specified that foreigners
were only to be allowed residence "when their character and reason for residence
was a guarantee of their meriting the afforded hospitality." Any foreigner who did not
fulfil these requirements could be denied residence. A confidential instruction stated
that Jews did not qualify. In addition, the decision that residence permits were to be
rescinded when the foreigner had changed or lost his nationality was also new which
can be seen as a reaction to the Polish expatriation law. Following this new
regulation deportation was no longer dependant on a foreign country declaring itself
ready to accept deportees.
A further conference in Gestapo headquarters, on the 20th September 1938, decided
to deport Polish Jews who had committed the most minor of offences, e.g. Road
Traffic Act offences. In addition, Polish Jews were to be made to depart Germany
"voluntarily" by increased persecution.
On the 6th October 1938 the Polish minister of the interior issued a regulation
regarding the control of all passports issued by Polish legations abroad. This
came into force on the 30th October 1938, 14 days after its publication on the 15th
October. All these passports had to be presented and received a special entry. This
entry could be refused if the authenticity or validity of the passport was in doubt or
when circumstances existed that justified revocation of citizenship. Passports lacking
this entry denied "crossing of the Polish border", i.e. entry. The American embassy in
Warsaw was informed by a member of the Polish foreign ministry that this regulation
was principally meant to prevent a universal deportation of Polish Jews by Germany.
The Germans were informed of this having received the report about the regulation
on the 18th October 1938. On the 26th October the head of the legal department of
the Foreign Office informed the German ambassador in Warsaw by telephone of the
directive:
"As a precaution, Polish Jews resident in Germany are to be immediately expelled
from Germany, without any delay. The German government will only refrain from the
immediate implementation of this action if the Polish government refrains from
implementing the 6th October 1938 regulation in Germany" or if it supplies a "binding
declaration" that Poland will allow entry to owners of Polish passports not possessing
the special control entry. On the 27th October the Polish Foreign Office replied that
the regulation only applied to "those individuals who had, on their own initiative,
applied to enter Poland". It was not expected that there would be large numbers of
such applications and consequent control of passports". It referred to the earlier
intervention of Polish legations abroad in protecting Polish citizens "from the effect of
German laws affecting German Jews". These interventions had been unsuccessful.
"Without concealing the fact that the Polish government did not want large numbers
of Polish passport holders returning to Poland having been deprived of their property
and thereby impoverished by German laws" the Polish Foreign Office expressed its
readiness to meet to "clarify the financial circumstances" of these individuals and to
find a "resolution to the entire problem". The German government had not expected
an accommodation by Poland and the Reichsführer SS and Head of the German
Police had already, on the 26th October, "after agreement with the Foreign Office"
instructed subordinate authorities, in two consecutive express letters, "to take all
Polish Jews possessing valid passports into custody pending deportation, deploying
the full force of the security and order police and having priority over all other tasks,
having served notices baning residence in Germany, and immediately deport them
via group transports to the Polish border. The group transports were to be organized
so that the handing over at the Polish border occured before the 29th October 1938.
The greatest number of Polish Jews possible, especially adult
males, are to be deported over the border before the stated date".
The Deportation Procedure.
What then occurred is described in the letter, that Otto Buchholtz wrote to his
relatives on the 19th December 1938 from Zbaszyn, quoted at the beginning of this
article. He testifies, as do practically all such reports, that this operation, whose
historical development is described above, was both unexpected and therefore
unprepared for by Polish Jews resident in Germany. Naturally, following the passing
of the new immigrant regulation ... foreign Jews resident in Germany should have
considered how much longer they were to be counted among those deserving of
German hospitality. But even when they were informed of the reasoning behind this
regulation, for example in Jewish newspapers, it was unthinkable, for those who had
resided in Germany for decades, that they would be suddenly deported. Almost 40%
of foreign Jews (1933) were born in Germany. Even had they seen the danger there
was little they could have done in the few weeks prior to the deportation operation.
They would have had to have abandoned their jobs or businesses and hastily left for
Poland where they would have been de facto second class citizens and to which the
majority had no connection. And emigration to third countries, even for German Jews
who were the direct subject of Nazi anti-Semitic laws, had become ever more difficult, as
finally the international conference on the refugee problem in Evian in June 1938
demonstrated. The representatives of the 32 participatory countries declared their
sympathy for the victims but at the same time argued that the economic and social
conditions in their countries prevented any increase in the immigration quota.
In Berlin, many clearly saw how things were developing, especially those active in the
Federation of Polish Jews. Whereas initially, one of the Federation leaders, who was
repeatedly on business in Warsaw and who had contact with Jewish representatives
in the Sejm and Senat and to government departments, was informed by the ministry
of the interior and foreign ministry that the new regulation was not directed against
Jews but against communists, especially Ukranians from east Galicia, the Polish
consul in Berlin confessed in private that his government did not wish any Jewish
immigration. But even in Berlin, where in September 1938 rumours were circlating
about a deportation of Polish Jews, initially no one believed them.
The operation did not take place everywhere simultaneously, in many towns on the
evening of the 27th October but in other towns in the early morning of the 28th
October. This led to Leipzig being warned by Halle so that only 50% of Polish Jews
were deported from there, from Dresden 90%, from Chemnitz 78%. In Berlin Rabbi
Freier learnt of the operation on the night of the 27th October and was able to warn
several people living in his immediate neighbourhood. Occasionally, those affected
nformed their friends. Because of how things developed, those who were not arrested on
these two days remained free.
The Reichsführer SS had ordered that "especially adult males" were to be deported.
This procedure, carried out within the short period before the expected closure of the
Polish border, promised to have the greatest effect: as one could assume that wives
and children would follow for financial reasons. The implementation of the deportation
operation varied according to place: in Württemberg entire families were deported, in
Baden generally only men, in Sachsen generally also entire families, in Hamburg,
Frankfurt and Munich likewise. Whereas Otto Buchholz was glad that his wife and
children were spared this experience others suffered the particular violence of family
separation. In some cases this resulted from the fact that family members resident in
different places in Germany were taken to different border crossings and thereby
interned in separate camps.
The arrest procedure also varied according to the individual police officer. One
individual reported that the Gestapo officer informed him that he was destined for
Palestine, a gibe entirely in keeping with Nazi propaganda which also made use of
genuine looking tickets stamped "single to Jerusalem". Another individual was
allowed time "to dress in peace, to pray and I will return in 10 minutes", and his wife
was allowed to remain behind. In Bochum the police duty officer provided a van to
transport the boiler with warm food provided by the Jewish community. During the
journey to the Polish border many police officers brought water to the deportees
travelling in locked carriages when the train stopped at various stations, whereas the
accompanying medical orderlies refused to do so. According to a young deportee the
security police officers behaved especially decently whereas the SS behaved like
criminals.
During the waiting period at the collection points in Germany some detainees
received meagre provisions from the police, which later, with respect to Hannover,
was used as propaganda by being described in such a stirring and detailed manner
that the reader received the "impression of a merry holiday journey". Most detainees
were instructed to supply themselves with provisions for two days. They were also
allowed to take 10 RM with them, which was the upper limit for the export of German
currency.
In reality it was the Jewish communities that took care of the deportees at the
collection points, in prisons or large dance halls, and at the transit railway stations on
the way to the border. It was not unusual for the entire Jewish community to compete
with one another to provide the pitiful people with that which would ease their journey,
and some individuals acquired the power of attorney so that relatives, friends or the
community could take of businesses. Solidarity was particularly evident in this time of
need, especially seen from the position of the Zionists who had, not entirely
justified, reproached the majority of German Jews for having distanced
themselves from east European Jews: "on this day all differences and social
distinctions ceased to exist ... The assimilated Jews, that specially rallied around the
German Federation of Jewish Front-Line Soldiers (First World War), also realised
that this was a dress rehearsal for something more threatening."
The station platforms, from which the special transports departed were closed off - in
all cases? Not only travellers but also railway workers were kept away. Nevertheless,
there were spectators who derided the deportees. Many deportees only received the
deportation order, the ground for their arrest, while on the journey. Initially, the special
transport was guarded by local or regional police, later, roughly in Upper Silesia, by
police there. In one case there were 59 police and 16 medical orderlies for 482
deportees, in another case 61 police for 724 deportees, and another with 16 to 17
police for around 400 deportees. The chief of police in Leipzig informed the minister
of the interior that "the deportation had been carried out essentially trouble-free and
without incident except for one death (a woman), fainting fits and nervous
breakdowns."
The deportees had to walk the last seven kilometres of the main deportation route
(Berlin-Posen) to the border station Zbaszyn. If anyone was unable to carry their
luggage or fell behind their luggage was taken from them and thrown away. "Those
who did not keep up were beaten." The first transports that arrived at the Polish
border crossing were allowed through but those following were denied entry. A
distressing report describes how the SS drove the deportees into the river that
formed the border. The Polish border guards followed them and after wandering
about for hours finally began a dispute with the SS about to whom these Jews
belonged. From another transport it was reported:
"There was a single Polish guard with a rusty rifle. He attempted stopping anyone
from entering. But the Germans jostled him from behind and told him: 'One man
cannot stop us!' Finally, several younger SS made a chain, ducked under the barrier,
and taunted the Pole with: 'Shoot us.' There were a number of shots in the air on the
Polish side but the crowd of SS pushed forward, raised the barrier, and arrived on
Polish soil."
According to Foreign Office documents the Poles finally moved up machine-guns and
erected barbed-wire barriers and threatened to open fire on those camped out in no
mans land.
Whereas the first to arrive were allowed to enter Poland those arriving later were
interned at the various border points. The best known of these was Zbaszyn, others
were Chrojnice and Drawski Mlyn. At Zbaszyn the deportees could take lodgings
when they had the money, i.e. brought in illegally when undiscovered by the
sometimes lax controls. Zbaszyn was however closed off to prevent them from
leaving. The other deportees were accommodated in military barracks, former
stables. Initially there was a total lack of services. The hygiene conditions were
appalling. However, within a short period a proper "town" came into being with
workshops, shops, a welfare department, a court of arbitration, a cleaning service
and police, with language courses and library. All this was accomplished by the
Warsaw established Jewish Relief Committee together with the internees. 500
deportees were employed thereby. Between 5,000 and 8,000 individuals were, at
different times, interned in the Zbaszyn camp until it was dissolved in July 1939. It is
unimaginable what problems this overcrowding caused.
The relief work was provided almost entirely by the local Jewish population but was
financed by foreign Jewish organisations, especially the American Joint Distribution
Committee (JDC). Its representative in Warsaw, Gitermann, reported in amazement
that the deportees in Kattowitz, which he considered to be very anti-Semitic, were
able to go about without being abused and that even some Christian Poles had given
them gifts. The regional administrators (Woiwode) of Silesian had gladly assisted
with the continuation of the
transports. The Christian population of Zbaszyn had also participated in the fate of
the deportees. The Polish government did not intervene in this matter and Gitermann
suspected that it wanted to exploit the situation so as to force Jewish emigration from
Poland. In fact, Polish diplomats in Washington, London and The Hague complained
that this situation had to be resolved before the general problem of Jewish refugees
from Germany could be tackled and that should the Polish-Jewish problem not be
promptly solved one should expect pogroms in Poland. Nevertheless, on the 2nd
December 1938, the Evian founded international committee declined to accept this
responsibility and to solve this matter of deportation for the Polish government.
German-Polish Negotiations.
The deportation operation had ended long before this. On the afternoon of the 29th
October 1938 Poland ordered the deportation of German citizens from Posen and
Pommerellen. However, when Germany argued that the deportation of "Aryan" German
citizens would aggravate the conflict, Poland restricted itself to only bringing German
Jews to the border. The German precondition for negotiations that the time limit for
passport inspection be extended to the 15th November had already been accepted by
Poland on the 28th October. Contrary to this the Polish ambassador instructed
consulates only in exceptional cases to issue Jews the necessary passport entry
before this date and thereafter to ruthlessly carry out expatriation. After the Gestapo
had declared the border situation "intolerable" and both Poland and Germany had
agreed to refrain from further deportations and to begin negotiations, the German
deportation operation was terminated on the 29th October 1938. Those deportees
who were already in Poland remained there, the rest were allowed to return to
Germany. The suggestion made by a subordinate member of the Gestapo that they
be interned in concentration camps was rejected by the Gestapo and Foreign Office.
At the beginning of negotiations on the 2nd November 1938 Germany again
demanded the return of all Polish Jews to Poland. On the following day, in an effort to
ease the tension, permanent secretary von Weizsächer assured the Polish
ambassador Lipski that the entire situation could have been avoided by talks
between the two of them had not Lipski been absent from Berlin at the end of
October. However, he insisted that Germany could not accept "that a lump of 40,000
to 50,000[!] stateless former Polish Jews should fall into their lap due to Poland's
expatriation procedures. He was unprepared to accept that the "adoption of Polish
property" meant a sacrifice for Poland. On the 8th November 1938 the Reichsführer
SS prohibited "for technical reasons, the deportation of Jews to Poland until further
notice".
The possibility of agreement emerged in these German-Polish negotiations.
Thereafter, Poland had to keep those deportees already in Poland and to permit
entry to their wives and children. Germany agreed to allow these deportees a short
period of re-entry to Germany for them to settle their personal affairs. Whereas the
Foreign Office was prepared to undersign, even without the complete attainment of
all Germany's aims, the Gestapo representative would not sign without Hitler's
express consent. He had been displeased with the cessation of the deportation
operation and was even more critical of Poland's negotiated settlement.
The negotiations were then suspended following the assassination of a counsellor to
the embassy in Paris, vom Rath, on the 10th November 1938, by Herschel Feibel
Grynszpan, a young Polish Jew. The negotiations were resumed on the 17th
December. The gain in time was opportune for Germany as there was still no list of
Polish Jews living in Germany. When finally the total was determined at only 13,000
the German and Polish positions converged. Finally, on the 24th January 1939, an
agreement was reached. Germany permitted the temporary return of deportees.
However, not more than 1,000 were allowed residence at any one time. All had to
have returned to Poland by the 31st July 1939. They were permitted to take back to
Poland their household contents, personal possessions and that which was
necessary for the pursuance of their profession. Their capital or proceeds of
liquidation had to be paid to a special account of the German foreign exchange bank.
Further arrangements remained undecided. The authorization of transfer of capital
abroad would have established a precedent of which immigration countries and the
Evian committee could have taken advantage. Poland committed itself to allowing entry to
the wives and children of the deportees. The police were instructed to immediately
register the wives and children of the deportees remaining in Germany via special
forms and, when in the meantime there had been no change, to extend the
husband's expatriation to them. Property and flats secured by the police were to be
freed. The sealing of flats was only to prevent unauthorized access. Writs of
execution from Bailiffs were not to be carried out.
Landlords who had not received rents for months but however could nor re-let, and
other creditors complained to the authorities. At the end of December, the Saxon
minister of the interior informed the Reichsführer SS that he could "no longer accept
responsibility" and that, on the 10th January 1939, he wished to release the
"settlement of the problems thrown up by the deportation operation". "I would simply
impute that only the interests of our fellow countrymen are to be considered and that
no regard should be given to compensation claims made by deportees or the Polish
government." When the deportees were enabled to settle their own affairs he kept his
control over who from the deportees wished to return to Germany.
The Palestine Office in Berlin and the Federation of Polish Jews assisted those
wishing to return. In individual cases the duration of stay was extended for several
days, i.e. to those wishing to return to Poland with their wives. Many of those who
attempted to settle their affairs by letter from Poland had to accept heavy financial
losses. So-called "liquidators" ("Abwickler") hastily sought buyers for business assets
and stocks.
The German Attempt at Illegal Deportation.
"The attempt should be made with immigration police methods to get as many Polish
Jews as possible to depart Germany" for whom Poland had made no assurance of
non-expatriation. On the 8th May 1939 Heydrich ordered the immigration police to see
that all women and children reported to the border department so that with certainty
they departed the country before the 31st July 1939 (up until this time only 1,500
personal forms had been submitted). More importantly, all Polish Jews possessing
passports lacking the special return entry and those whom Poland had deprived of
their citizenship were to be denied residence in Germany. If they did not freely leave
they were to be deported, not by mass transport as in October 1938 but
inconspicuously, illegally over the border. All were to have departed Germany before
the 31st July or at least be in "remand, in concentration camps, pending deportation".
But, as a result of intensified Polish border surveillance, the attempt to illegally deport
large numbers of people in July had to be abandoned. At most one could be rid of
only one or two people in this way. For this reason certain groups of people were
excluded from deportation: the old and frail, children who could not be
accommodated abroad within the set time period, and individuals whose emigration
was arranged for the coming six months, and others. During the summer many of
these Jews sought to cross the border into Poland illegally by bribing Polish civil
servants or with the support of the German police, who were exceptionally helpful in
this matter - they were even prepared to carry luggage!
The 9th/10th November Pogrom ("Kristallnacht")
The effect of the Poland Operation in October 1938 was not limited to foreign Jews
but encompassed the general persecution of Jews in Germany: the seventeen year
old Herschel Feibel Grynszpan, from Hannover, living with his uncle in Paris, himself
having been served a deportation order from France, received a letter from his family
interned in Zbaszyn. This news and newspaper accounts, for example in the Paris
published "Hajnt" of the 4th November, drove him to his act of despair which
presented the Nazis with the welcome pretext for staging the 9th/10th November
Pogrom (so-called "Reichskristallnacht") and the further intensification of persecution
of Jews in Germany. On the 7th November 1938 Grynszpan shot vom Rath, a young
counsellor to the embassy in Paris, who died of his wounds two days later. Both
when he shot and at his arrest he cited, as motive, the deportation of the Polish Jews
from Germany, which included his family.
Years later, after the Vichy regime had extradited him at the request of Germany and
his trial was pending, he was accused of being the procurer for the homosexual vom
Rath who had cheated him out of his commission, or that he himself had had a
homosexual relationship with vom Rath. This depoliticized his act and led, together
with other factors, to his trial being postponed. The trial never took place. This
assertion, denied by Grynszpan, is totally implausible.
Grynszpan was initially interned in Sachsenhausen concentration camp, then in
Moabit prison, and, following the postponement of his trial, probably again in
Sachsenhausen, where he was interrogated by Eichmann. Whereas relatives
asserted that he was dead, in 1960, various German newspapers reported that he
was living under a false name in Paris, although the crime came under the statute of
limitations there, which the historian who first researched the case also maintained.
On the 1st June 1960 the Hannover district court declared him dead with affect from
the 8th May 1945. It is most unlikely that the Jew Grynszpan, guilty of murdering a
German diplomat, would have survived the Holocaust. "Herschel Feibel Grünspan's
assassination of vom Rath made him too 'prominent' for Auschwitz".
The "Poland Operation" as Model for future Deportations.
The Deportation Operation of 1938 became a model for later Nazi measures
against the Jews: it was the first mass deportation that called for the co-ordination of
the police, the state railways, and the diplomatic and financial authorities. The fact
that Poland was incapable of and unwilling to dissolve the Zbaszyn camp demonstrated
Germany's success in making other nations jointly responsible for its Jewish policy.
The international community reacted with indifference.
Poland's share of responsibility cannot be denied. The following plan from
ambassador Lipski conclusively demonstrates not only Poland's unwillingness to
safeguard its Jewish citizens but even to leave them to the mercy of a foreign power.
The majority of shareholders of the Polish oil industry in Galicia were Austrian Jews.
Following German's annexation ("Anscluss") of Austria, Poland feared that the
shares would be seized by Germany. In July 1938, Lipski proposed, to the Polish
deputy foreign minister, that a settlement be made with Germany whereby Poland
passively accept the dispossession of the property of Polish Jews in Germany in
reciprocation for which Germany abandon its deportation of Polish Jews to Poland. In
addition, Germany was to hand over to Poland the oil shares possessed by its Jewish
citizens of what was formerly Austria. Poland initially abandoned the implementation
of its expatriation law in order to exploit the property of its own citizens. In this context
the planned passport control order by Poland in October 1938 was an additional
abandonment of the law of expatriation and held the way open for a Clearing
Agreement with Germany regarding the confiscation of property of Polish Jews.
The Poland Operation made something else clear: as soon as a foreign government
opposed German policy, as the Poles did by deporting German citizens in reprisal
and its persistence in making no guarantee for later entry to Poland for those Polish
Jews remaining in Germany, the Nazis were forced to backtrack on their policy. The
Poland Operation and the earlier deportation of 500 Soviet Jews in January 1938
demonstrated that Germany felt confident enough also to direct its anti-Semitic policy
against foreign Jews. Both the Soviet reciprocal action of deporting 150 German
citizens and the Polish reciprocal action demonstrated that Germany did not act
independently against foreigners but rather used situations presented to them from abroad. The
Soviets also denied entry to their Jewish citizens deported by Germany but the
difference here was that Germany interned them in concentration camps. These reactions
by the Soviet Union and Poland in no way qualify German responsibility.
Germany's Invasion of Poland.
When, on the 1st September 1939, Germany invaded Poland some of those deported
Polish Jews who had temporarily returned to Germany to settle their affairs were still
in the country. They, and all the other Jews in Germany, were now totally at the
mercy of Nazi persecution. On the 7th September the men were interned in
concentration camps and not, as is customary for foreign citizens, in civilian
confinement. The women were registered by name, the property confiscated. Those
who had been deported to Poland in the Poland Operation of September 1938 were
again arrested and initially herded into ghettos and then, like the German Jews,
deported to the extermination camps where they were murdered. Only a few of these
Polish Jews escaped the Holocaust by managing to emigrate from Poland.
Cäcilie Buchholz was deported to Gurs, with the Jews from Baden. Her daughter was
safe in England and was brought up in the Jewish faith by her benefactors there. Otto
Buchholz, whose letter at the beginning of this article describes his journey from
Mannheim to Zbaszyn, was unable to realize his application for emigration to the
USA which he made in Warsaw in the winter of 1939. In 1941 he was still living in the
Warsaw ghetto. He was later declared dead.
German text
Trude Maurer: Abschiebung und Attentat. Die Ausweisung der polnischen Juden und
der Vorwand für die "Kristallnacht". in:
Walter H. Pehle (ed.): Der Judenpogrom 1938. Von der "Reichskristallnacht" zum
Völkermord. Frankfurt am Main 1988.
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